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THE PLANNING PROCESS AND ITS FORMALIZATION
IN COMPUTER MODELS
ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to provide a conceptual framework for designing
computer planning models. Planning is viewed as a sequential, hierarchical,
and iterative process. Each level in the hierarchy involves essentially
the same five-step planning sequence: 1) determine planning data; 2) pro-
pose alternative plans and generate their consequences; 3) select the best
alternative analyzed; 4) translate the plan into a form for lower-level
planning; and 5) control the plan. Planning at each level is subject to
constraints imposed by the organizational structure and goals, resources
and information available, and various forms of programmed behavior. Efforts
to improve the planning process (and hence plans) must act primarily through
these planning constraints. The role of computers in planning is examined
in light of these concepts. It is concluded that a formalized computer
planning model will, like all planning, have a hierarchical structure.
Planning with such a model will involve a man-machine search through the
hierarchical space of alternative plans.
1 . INTRODUCTION
Planning is a universal component of management. And yet, to a con-
siderable extent, it is not well understood by those who practice it. Many
managers fancy themselves men of action, and view planning as an "unproductive"
paperwork activity. In fact, however, it is through planning that a high-level
manager can exert the greatest influence over his organization.
. Although there persists a general lack of appreciation of the planning
function, considerable progress has been made in gaining a better under-
standing of its role (Goetz, 1949; Newman, 1951; Koontz and O'Donnell, 1964).
We have also witnessed in recent years great strides in the allied field of
organization theory (Barnard, 1938; March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March,
1963) . The progress made in these more traditional areas of management has
been accompanied by an explosive expansion of knowledge in related theoretical

fields. Developments in cybernetics, systems theory, and decision theory
have provided extremely valuable insights into the planning and control
process . Concurrent advances in information technology now make it eco-
nomically feasible to manipulate vast quantities of data.
Despite this substantial progress, our understanding of organizational
planning and control remains far from complete. We are victims of a cultural
lag: Advances in the traditional and technical fields have not been suf-
ficiently amalgamated to form a unified theory of planning. The lack of
such theory accounts, in part, for some of the difficulties that have been
encountered in applying information technology in organizations
.
I have attempted in this paper to achieve a synthesis of the fields
related to planning. In doing so, I have borrowed shamelessly from both
traditional and theoretical literature. Accordingly, much of what I have
written is not especially new, a fact I have tried to indicate by a pro-
fusion of references to past work. On the other hand, I would like to
think that the resulting conceptual model--! hesitate to dignify it by the
term "theory" --does provide a new and useful way of viewing the planning
process
.
The construct that I propose is intended to characterize any planning
process, whether it involves elaborate formal procedures or very informal
methods. It does not, however, provide a descriptive model that predicts
or duplicates the behavior of a planner. Even less does it furnish a
normative model that tells a planner how he ought to make planning decisions.
The construct is intended to give deeper insight into the fundamental
nature of the planning process. A designer of an improved planning system
should approach his task with a clear viewpoint about the role of planning.
Tie "model" that represents this viewpoint must meet two testr
.
First, it must somehow provide a useful set of abstractions that
facilitate thinking about the planning process. In order to do this, the
model should be general enough to encompass all forms of planning, and it
should be concise enough to become a ready part of the designer's vocabulary

of thought. Such a model makes it easier to perceive an over-all rationale
behind the complex network of planning that takes place within any organi-
zation. In the absence of this point of view, each planning task appears
as a special case rather than as part of a unified whole.
Second, the model should incorporate the best of the traditional
wisdom about planning. Good planning practice should be capable of being
explained or justified in terms of the model. The model should also be
consistent with available theoretical knowledge.
I have tried to satisfy these criteria in developing a construct of
planning. Although the model is necessarily abstract, certain practical
ends motivated its construction. I am interested eventually in implementing
formalized computer models to aid the planner, and the first step in doing
this is the development of a suitable "world view" about the process. After
describing the conceptual model of planning, I go on in this paper to out-
line a form that a computer planning system might take. However, my comments
about implementation are, I must confess, mostly of the arm-waving variety,
and only suggest a direction for further research.
2. THE ROLE OF PLANS
Planning has been given a variety of meanings. In its broadest sense,
it is "deciding in advance what is to be done" (Newman, 1951, p. 15). De-
fined in such sweeping terms, planning necessarily precedes all action, if
only in the mind of the person performing the action. Although the con-
ceptual model described later is quite general, this paper deals primarily
with relatively formal planning that involves the explicit evaluation of
alternative courses of action, selection of one of the alternatives for
execution, and formal communication of the decision to interested persons
throughout the organization.
A great many different types of activities fall within such a definition.
Among them are the design of the organizational structure and goals, selection
of resources, specification of policies and procedures, budgeting, and detailed

scheduling (Goetz, 1949, p . 2) . All of these varied activities together
comprise the planning network by which the organization governs itself.
A plan constitutes the output from any planning process. Thus,
organizational goals, policies, strategies, budgets, procedures, rules,
programs, and schedules represent various forms of plans (Koontz and O'Donnell,
1964, pp. 74-78). The purpose of a plan is to bring about behavior that
leads to desired outcomes. In order to do this, a formal plan must (1) de-
scribe actions and outcomes, and (2) serve as a formal vehicle of manage-
ment. I will examine both of these in some detail.
2.1 The Plan as a Description of Actions and Outcomes ,
The planning and control function of an organization plays the role
of central nervous system, and plans represent the "messages" by which
the system communicates among organizational units. The form of communi-
cation may vary. A plan may continue in effect until explicitly rescinded
or modified, and is then evoked under specified conditions or by a higher-
level plan. Goals, policies, procedures, and "standing plans" (Newman,
1951, p. 18) have this characteristic. They represent continuing performance
programs (March and Simon, 1958, pp. 141-150) by which higher-levels in the
organization govern lower-level behavior. Their continuity increases the
stability of the organization, and thus makes it easier for one subunit
to predict the behavior of another (including the behavior of its own lower-
level subunits)
.
On the other hand, ad hoc plans may be devised to describe behavior
over a specified planning horizon. Project plans and periodic budgets
and schedules are examples of these "single-use" plans. Occasionally it
may be necessary to formulate two or more alternative "contingency" plans,
deferring the choice of the specific alternative to execute until additional
information is available (such as the strategy followed by a competitor or
opponent) . However, the added cost of generating multiple ad hoc plans is
justified only in those cases in which plans cannot otherwise be formulated
and disseminated within the required response time.
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Sometimes it Is advantageous to express a plan in a functional form
in which the values of certain variables are initially left unspecified.
For example, a "variable" budget might define overhead cost as a function
of production quantity. Once the functional relationship is established,
the determination of a specific plan involves merely the evaluation of *•
the function when the values of the unspecified variables become known. This
scheme offers the double advantage of drastically reducing planning response
time and lowering the cost of repetitive planning. The functional relation-
ship need not be formulated again until a significant change occurs in the
underlying conditions on which it is based.
A plan may be quite specific, leaving very little discretion to those
responsible for its execution. It may, on the other hand, merely provide
loose guidelines, or it may prohibit or require only certain actions. The
latter type of plan is illustrated by a policy that requires the purchasing
department to maintain alternative sources of supply.
Plans, like computer programs, may be expressed in either procedural
or declarative form. A procedural plan specifies a step-by-step sequence
of actions that presumably will lead to a known (and desired) outcome.
Alternatively, a declarative plan only specifies a desired outcome, and
leaves to those executing it the responsibility for choosing the sequence
of actions necessary to achieve it. Often the same plan has both procedural
and declarative aspects.
Whatever its form, a plan is described in terms of variables. A manu-
facturing schedule, for example, may be described in terms of units of
production, manpower levels, and costs. The variables provide only an
Procedural and declarative descriptions correspond, respectively,
to process and state descriptions (Simon, 1962, p. 479) or to activity
and product specifications (March and Simon, 1958, pp. 144-146).

abstract representation of planned behavior. This is particularly true
of high-level plans dealing largely with gross aggregates. But even in
its most detailed form, a plan specifies an extremely sparse set of
variables out of the infinite set possible.
The specification of a given plan consists of placing values on its
variables or establishing its functional form. Independence obviously
does not exist among all of the variables and relationships that could
be used to describe a plan. The choice of the decisions that are treated
as independent is essentially arbitrary, and depends to a considerable
*
extent on computational efficiency and on how the planner chooses to express
his decisions. Those decisions used for this purpose will be called de -
cision variables . All other variables used to describe a plan will be
termed outcome variables. The value of an outcome variable is implied
by the choice of the decision variables.
These notions can be illustrated by an inventory control example.
A given inventory plan may be described by such variables as the aggregate
inventory investment, the planned stockout probability, and the imputed
interest rate on funds invested in inventory. Once an algorithm has been
specified for determining inventory decisions (constituting a higher-level
plan), the stockout probability and imputed interest rate can be treated
as decision variables. The resulting aggregate inventory investment repre-
sents an outcome variable. If, on the other hand, an algorithm exists for
allocating aggregate inventory among individual items (see, for example,
Emery, 1960), then aggregate inventory can be treated as a decision variable
*
I use the term planner throughout this paper to describe the person
having decision-making authority for planning at a given level in the organ-
ization. The planner may, of course, be assisted by a staff, and in practice
it may be difficult to pinpoint the real locus of decision making due to a
certain amount of diffusion of effective authority.
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span. One outcome variable may be a function of other outcome variables --
an aggregation of different cost classifications, say, or the discounted
present value of similar costs incurred in different time periods.
If the planner does not know the relationship existing between two
outcome variables, he might wish to describe a plan in terms of both, even
though one is clearly subsumed under the other. For example, profit and
the inventory stockout rate of finished goods might both be used as outcome
variables, although presumably the latter is of no inherent interest except
insofar as it has some (generally unknown) effect on long-range profit.
If it is feasible to do so, the description of a plan should recognize
the fact that most outcome variables cannot be predicted with certainty.
An outcome might, for example, be defined in terms of a confidence interval
or a probability distribution, rather than by a single value. Unfortunately,
the determination of such probabilistic variables can add enormously to the
cost of planning and control. Often it is necessary to treat the world as
though it were deterministic, leaving to the planner the task of compensating
for uncertainty.
A decision variable such as aggregate inventory may have intrinsic
interest in its own right, as well as serving as a description of controllable
behavior. The complete description of an alternative should therefore include
both decision and outcome variables. In most cases, of course, the simul-
taneous display of all relevant variables would be awkward and confusing. The
important factor is not what is_ displayed, but what potentially can be dis-
played. Ideally, the planner should be able to call out selectively for display
those variables in which he is currently interested.
*
Conceptually, it is often useful to think of a network of plans
described in matrix form. Goetz (1965), for example, uses such a format,
in which cost and revenue classifications are listed in one dimension and
time periods in the other. The programming system for taa Office of the Secretary
of Defense (1962, pp. II-5 - II-9) uses a similar conceptual display of plans,
in which physical or dollar resource inputs represent one dimension of the
array and outputs (expressed in terms of program elements , or units of military
force such as Minuteman squadrons) represent the other dimension.

2.2 The Plan as a Formal Vehicle of Management ;
A plan not only describes desired behavior, but it also jerves as a
formal vehicle for guiding lower-level activities and communicating throughout
the organization. With this philosophy, the act of choosing a plan (or,
equivalently, approving one proposed by a lower-level unit) constitutes one
of the most important functions of management.
Upon approval, a plan becomes part of a network of plans that serves
as the basis for execution and coordination. Any significant addition, de-
letion, or modification of a specific plan should be effected only through
the same official approval mechanism that first authorized it. Failure to
do this may rob the plan of its integrity and thwart the objectives of the
original planner. This concept is very much in evidence in the program-
ming system of the Department of Defense.
In order for the approved plan network to play this central role, it
must be based on the best current predictions of future events (within
allowed error tolerances). This, in turn, calls for a control system that
takes periodic samples of actual events and compares them with the predictions
on which the current plans are based. If a significant deviation occurs, the
control system signals the need for new planning that takes into account the
most recent available feedback information about the environment. With such
a control system to "close the loop," planners at all levels in the organi-
zation can look to the latest plan network as a reliable source of infor-
mation for execution and further planning.
Management under these circumstances can largely focus on the planning
process. Far from being just a sterile paperwork or bureaucratic activity,
planning should provide the basic means of directing the behavior of the
brganization. It is not exaggerating too much to view a high-level manager
as a planner who lives largely in an analogue, abstract world involving the
predicted future. He is affected by the real world only to the extent that
its essence is captured in his analogue planning world. The planner, like
the brain (Bishop, 1960), is forever cut off from the world "out there," and
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can only perceive things through highly filtered information channels.
3. THE SINGLE -LEVEL PLANNING PROCESS
A plan that guides behavior in an organization constitutes the output
from a planning process. A given plan may be ephemeral, but the process
that generates it tends to persist for a relatively long time. For example,
basic changes may occur very infrequently in a planning system that generates
weekly production schedules. Modification of a planning process has a more
fundamental and lasting influence on the organization than does direct modi-
fication of its output. Understanding the planning process is therefore an
obvious prerequisite to gaining insight into the way in which an organization
can improve its behavior.
Conceptually, the steps involved in a planning process are largely in-
dependent of the level in the organization where the planning takes place.
To be sure, the scope of the process varies greatly with level. High-level
processes deal with aggregate variables extending over relatively long time
John VJ. Gardner (1964, pp. 78-79) views formal information systems
with some suspicion. Raw data are "sampled, screened, condensed, compiled,
coded, expressed in statistical form, spun into generalizations and crystallized
into recommendations" before reaching high-level planners. In the process,
"emotions, feeling, sentiment, mood and almost all the irrational nuances
of human situations" are filtered out, and therefore the information cannot
convey what is really going on in the world.
The danger certainly exists that a high-level planner will not be pro-
vided relevant information about the world. But the real world is a very
complicated place, and a high-level planner inevitably perceives it in an
exceedingly abstracted form. This is true whether he obtains the information
through firsthand observation or through a formal information system. Such a
planner faces a world of vast scope, and therefore he must re?y primarily on
a formal information system to filter out "noise" and less important data and
to provide an abstraction of the real world that preserves essential infor-
mation about significant events. From the standpoint of information gathering,
visits by the planner to the "front lines" can only furnish a small sample
with which he can verify information provided by the formal information system.
(But personal contact with lower levels in the organization serve other purposes
besides information gathering, of course.)
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intervals, while low-level processes deal in much finer detail. Kigh-level
planning, such as the determination of corporate marketing strategy, is
typically much less clearly defined and structured than low- level planning
involving, for example, the determination of production schedules. Never-
theless, the similarities, rather than the differences, best characterize
the planning process at all levels.
Planning is an enormously complex process, and so defies any simple
scheme for describing it . Much of its complexity stems from the hierarchical
nature of planning, in which plans at one level impose constraints on planning
at lower levels. Before going into this matter in more detail, I shall con-
aider first the steps involved at a given single level in the total hierarchy.
The following sequence of steps is admittedly somewhat arbitrary and largely
ignores the iterative nature of planning, but it at least describes the
essential character of a single-level process.
3 . 1 Determine Basic Planning Data
The first step in planning is to determine the values of the basic
data to be used. These planning data (or planning factors in military
terminology) constitute the "building blocks" from which plans are generated
(Goetz, 1949, pp. 92-115).
The nature of the "basic" data depends very much on the level of the
planning process. Basic data for a low-level process may be very detailed
indeed. For example, a planner in a maintenance department might formulate
his budget using such data as the costs of various types of supplies and
the wage rate of different grades of labor. Basic data for high-level
planning, on the other hand, are typically quite aggregated. A manufacturing
division, for instance, might budget maintenance costs on the basis of a
racio of past costs to total dollar production.
*
Manheim (1964, pp. 18-19) uses the term single - level operator to describe
the planning carried on at a given level.
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Often basic planning data at one level are derived as a result of more
detailed planning at lower levels. For instance, a figure for the average
wage rate used in corporate planning may be derived from a detailed lower-
level analysis. The data can also come from higher levels as a result of
their planning--a sales forecast imposed on a manufacturing division, for
example
.
Basic planning data are not mere "facts" retrieved from the organ-
ization's data base. Facts are always historical, and planning involves
the future. To be sure, the future can only be predicted on the basis
of information about the past, but the transformation of historical data
into predicted values of planning data may involve a complex series of
operations. For example, an elaborate regression analysis might be used
in sales forecasting. Sometimes past data call for "normalization" in
order to wash out the effects of non-standard conditions prevailing in
the past. The determination of planning data might also require what
amounts to a policy decision, as in the case of the specification of an
allowed scrap rate used for budgeting a manufacturing operation.
Any prediction is, of course, subject to error. In some cases the
potential error is slight or insignificant. Under certain other con-
ditions, the planning process is such that an unbiased estimate of the
mean of a planning datura can serve as a certainty equivalent . even though
the estimate is subject to considerable uncertainty. When random variability
*
In general, the available alternative that leads to the best ex-
pected results in the face of uncertainty is not the same one that would
be selected if unbiased mean estimates of all planning data are used in
evaluating alternatives; only under special circumstances are the decisions
the same (?:heil, 1961, pp. 414-424 ; Bellman, 1961). However, even if the
nec,e8sary assumptions are not fulfilled, many "routine" decision processes
tend to be relatively insensitive to the substitution of mean estimates for
random variables. Conway and Maxwell (1963) and Muth (1963) discuss this issue
in connection with job shop scheduling.
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in estimates is either insignificant or irrelevant to decision making,
th<i Information system need only provide unbiased point predictions. This
greatly simplifies the problems of data storage and computation connected
with the prediction process and the subsequent use of the predictions in
planning. If point estimates are not sufficient, the information system
must provide additional data about variability in the form of interval
estimates, estimates of variance or other parameters of probability distri-
butions, or conceivably even a complete history of individual events.
Once planning data have been determined, their predicted values remain
In effect over the prediction span or until feedback data from the control
system provide clear evidence that the predictions are in significant error.
Thus, feedback data are not used directly in planning, but only indirectly
through the prediction process. The prediction process, in turn, filters
much of the noise contained in the feedback data, and thereby stabilizes
plans
.
3.2 Propose Alternative Plans and Generate Their Predicted Outcomes
The second step in planning is the manipulation of the basic planning
data in order to determine the consequences of proposed alternative plans.
Each plan proposed by the planner is described by means of its decision
variables, and the consequences stemming from these decisions are des-
cribed in terms of outcome variables
.
The transformation of decision variables into outcome variables re-
quires some sort of model . This is true whether the planner uses a formal-
ized model--expressed perhaps in the form of mathematical equations or a
computer simulation program--or informal, "back of the envelope" methods.
In every case he must rely on an abstract representation of reality (Craik,
19w3, p. 61). Planning models of course vary greatly in theii degree of
accuracy in predicting outcomes, in their complexity and completeness, and
in their formality.
3.3 Select the "Best" Alternative
From the list of alternatives proposed and analyzed in the previous
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step, the planner must select the plan that appears most suitable. His
choice Is governed by the goals that have been assigned to him as a result
of a higher-level planning process. If he has a single measurable goal,
he can simply choose the plan that leads to the best performance in terms
of that goal.
Rarely does such a straightforward situation exist. Instead, a planner
virtually always faces multiple goals and uncertain consequences of his
actions. Under these circumstances, the decision process of the planner
becomes very much more complex than merely choosing the alternative having
**
the highest utility.
When facing uncertainty and multiple goals, a planner cannot, in
general, find a dominant alternative that is least risky and best along
all goal dimensions. If this situation existed, it would generally be
advantageous for the planner to explore more alternatives (perhaps in the
"region" of the dominant alternative) in order to probe for his efficiency
frontier , along which the improvement in one goal dimension implies a
worsening in one or more other dimensions (Hitch and McKean, 1960, pp. 109-114)
Fig. 1 illustrates this concept. Suppose an inventory planner has two
goals: reduce the aggregate inventory investment and reduce the stockout
rate. Suppose further that he has generated alternatives A, B, and C.
*
This, of course, will not represent the "optimum" plan unless all
alternatives have either been considered explicitly or have been rejected
by some logical means as being inferior to the set of explicitly considered
plans. The true--but unknown- -optimum recognizes the cost of searching for
improved alternatives, and therefore rejects a stubborn hunt for the "perfect"
plan.
**
For brevity and consistency with economic literature, I jill use the
somewhat discredited term utility to describe the preference index by which
the relative desirability of a plan is measured.
Decision making under uncertainty is formally similar to decision
making with multiple goals. The measures of uncertainty--probability or
variance estimates, for example- -constitute an additional dimension by
which a plan is described.
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In this case he would clearly choose alternative A, since it dominates the
other two. However, further exploration might reveal alterna;:ives D and E,
which are not dominated by A and therefore call for a hard choice in trading-
off improvement in one dimension at the sacrifice of poorer performance in
the other.
$12 •
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Fig. I - Choice of Alternative Inventory Plans
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The efficiency frontier, by definition, defines the potential alternatives
confronting the planner. As in Fig. 1, the frontier is generally not known,
and available alternatives do not exhaust all possibilities for improvement.
However, the cost of probing for improved plans may exceed the expected gain
(at least in the opinion of the planner) , and therefore the planner might
settle for a choice among alternatives A, D and E (alternatives B and C being
dismissed because of their dominance by A)
.
In resolving a choice that involves a trade-off among multiple goals.
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the planner might specify an explicit utility (or trade -off ) function that
transforms all goals into a single compound goal (Klahr, 1958', Ackoff, 1962,
pp. 42-44) . Once this has been done, the choice becomes a trivial one: select
the alternative with the highest utility in terms of the compound goal. In
Fig. 1, the utility function is plotted in the form of three contour lines,
U. , U , and U , that pass through the alternatives A, D, and E. (These
contours are, of course, the well-known indifference curves of the economist.)
The contour line closest to the origin clearly has the highest utility, and
so alternative A is the one selected out of the known alternatives available.
The specification of the explicit utility function obviously represents
the critical step in the selection analysis. The function must embody the
planner's "trus" goals (and those of higher-level planners). In most cases
*
these goals are extremely difficult to describe in analytical form. A formal
description would have to recognize the complex and subtle Interactions that
may occur among goals. For example, under normal circumstances, the survival
of the organization is not threatened. The organization can thus indulge in
research and development projects, improvements in the corporate image, added
security and benefits for its employees, and other such future-directed goals
of the affluent organization. If, however, the life of the organization (or
the planner's existence within the organization) is at stake, then all other
goals tend to be swamped in a single-minded quest for survival.
An attempt to develop an explicit utility may prove fruitful in guiding
decisions and providing insights. However, it is unlikely to do more than that,
particularly in the case of higher-level planning. The planner typically does
not know enough about his utility function to formalize it completely, and he
The difficulty in specifying a planner's utility function should not
be too surprising. If the function could be captured once and for all in
analytical form, one of the primary responsibilities of the manager would
be eliminated: any clerk or computer can rank a series of single-dimensional
numbers
.
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obviously cannot defer decisions until he does. Different goals are often
hopelessly incommensurable (in the sense that no generally agreed trade-off
exists among them); in this case, a spurious trade-off function suppresses
information about alternative plans rather than simplifying the selection
process (Hitch and McKean, p. 185).
Nevertheless, some formalization is extremely useful and, indeed,
necessary in most cases. Even if all goals cannot be collapsed into a
single compound goal, the number of separate goals can be reduced through
the use of a trade-off function among a subset of the goals. Without this
compression, the planner would be swamped with an unmanageable abundance of
competing goals. For example, in evaluating alternative aircraft designs,
it may be possible to achieve a fairly general concensus about the trade-
offs between various performance variables such as speed, range, altitude,
rate of climb, and payload. By use of the trade-off transformation, each
alternative design can be assigned a single index of performance. Similar
indices might be developed for "cost" and "logistic support," say. The
final choice of design is thus reduced to the comparison of alternatives
described in terms of three incommensurable composite dimensions rather
than a whole host of detailed dimensions.
The hierarchical aggregation of management information also illustrates
the concept of goal compression. For most purposes, a particularly simple
trade-off function is used: all variables within an aggregation are con-
sidered equivalent, or at most a weighting factor (dollar value, say) is
applied to each of the different variables. Sales reports, for instance.
*
Herberstroh (1958, pp. 68-69) concludes that any stable organization
can deal with only a relatively small number of mutually independent goals.
Schleh (1961, pp. 22 - 23) suggests no more than five separate goals should
be assigned.
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may be available at the lowest level by salesman and individual item.
These detailed data may then be combined into state, regional, and national
totals in increasingly large aggregations. The sub-totals available at
each level presumably correspond to the goals appropriate to that level.
(It should be mentioned that the use of a trade-off function involves
the risk of washing out relevant information. For that reason, a planner
should be able to examine the components of a composite goal. Thus, the
decision maker selecting an aircraft design might want to look at separate
performance characteristics, and a national sales manager might want to
examine the detailed sales within a region below its sales goal. The
ability to trace the cause of major deviations through a hierarchical
search of the details should be incorporated within any information system.)
The specification of a utility function can be made more feasible
by reducing the resolution used in measuring alternatives. For example,
the investment in inventory in a large company. could be rounded to the
nearest million dollars. Two plans might therefore differ by almost a
million dollars and still be indistinguishable in terms of the inventory
investment goal.
A constraint can be viewed as a special type of low-resolution utility
function that distinguishes between only two values for a given goal,
"acceptable" or "not acceptable." Thus, a planner might establish a con-
straint of $5 million on inventory; plans involving a projected inventory
investment exceeding this figure would therefore be rejected. If all goal
dimensions except one are constrained in this manner, the selection of a
plan again is reduced to choosing the alternative having the highest ratihg
in terms of the remaining goal. If constraints are attached to all dimensions,
the planner follows a satisf icing strategy and chooses the first alternative
found that meets all constraints^. (March and Simon, pp. 48-50 and 140-141) .
The specification of constraints greatly simplifies the selection process
by effectively eliminating the constrained dimensions from the evaluation of
the alternatives that survive the constraints. However, the low resolution

- 19
of constraints carries the risk of failing to distinguish between alternatives
that differ significantly. Because of this, a plan that is distinctly superior
to its alternatives except in the constrained dimension might be overlooked
because it fails to meet the constraint. If the planner were confronted
with an explicit trade-off between the constrained dimension and the other
dimensions, he might vastly prefer the rejected plan to all others (Hitch
and McKean, p. 186). In Fig. 1, for example, a $5 million constraint on
the inventory investment causes the rejection of alternative A and the ac-
ceptance of E. However, if presented with the option of a decrease in the
stockout rate from .12 to .08 at the penalty of an additional $1 million in
Inventory, the planner might accept the trade-off and choose plan A.
Even if a planner cannot specify an explicit utility function, he
must still make a choice among alternatives on the basis of his assignment
of subjective utility values. By so doing, he implicitly establishes bounds
on the trade-offs between goals. In the previous example, if the planner
selects plan A in preference to plan E, he is implying that he is willing
to increase inventory by at least $1 million in order to reduce the stockout
rate from .12 to .08. A trade-off decision obviously conveys less information
than does the specification of an explicit utility function, but it is also
much easier to make. Whenever a planner selects a given plan, he should,
of course, be made aware of the trade-offs implied by his choice so that he
can assess whether, in fact, the choice does represent his subjective utility
function.
A subjective utility function, by its very nature, is ill-defined. It
*
According to the explicit utility function in Fig. 1, the planner would
actually be willing to increase ilnventory by over $2 million in order to
achieve the specified reduction in the stockout rate.
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is apt to change over time in response to changes in the planner's per-
ceptions, insights, asperation level, and "judgment." Furthermore, there
is no reason to suppose that the planner always assigns consistent utilities
*
(in the sense that they exhibit transitivity)
.
Regardless of how the planner assigns utilities, he may decide that
none of the alternatives currently available to him is acceptable. He may
therefore propose and analyze additional alternatives. He will continue
to do so until he feels that the cost of further search exceeds the expected
improvement in utility that it will bring (Goetz, 1949, pp. 173-175).
3 . 4 Translate the Selected Plan into a Form for Execution ,
The variables used in planning need not be the same ones employed
to communicate with other parts of the organization. For example, a planner
might factor variables into more detailed form before assigning them to
lower-level planners. Thus, a production superintendent might factor an
assembly schedule into several component schedules, and assign responsi-
bility for each to a given foreman. (This obviously assumes that the out-
come as predicted by the higher-level planning is essentially invariant
with respect to the factoring.) In other cases, a planner might choose
to aggregate variables before passing them down to lower-level planners.
He might do this, for example, in the spirit of decentralization, relying
on the lower-level planners to develop their own detailed plans constrained
by aggregate variables that have been found feasible through a more detailed
analysis. Regardless of how the translation is performed, however, the end
result should be a clear-cut assignment of responsibility for carrying out
Some "inconsistencies" may be more apparent than real. If the formal
outcome variables do not include, important but unquantified characteristics
of a plan (pertaining to risk, say), then what appears to be formally
"irrational" may merely reflect differences in the submerged variables
(Bowman, 1963).
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every portion of the total plan,
3.5 Control of the Plan ;
The final step in the single-level planning process is the control
of the approved plan. The control system compares actual performance
against the plan, and determines the deviations that exceed control toler-
ances. Exception messages .identify these deviations, and trigger any
necessary replanning. Such planning involves the same sequence of steps
used in the creation of the earlier plan. It examines the current situation
anew, constrained only by higher- level plans and the consequences stemming
from past actions. With an adequate control system, planning thus becomes
more flexible and "continuous" rather than rigid and periodic.
The feedback information provided by the control system serves three
important functions. For one thing, it encourages more realistic initial
planning and closer adherence to plans once approved. Of course, the en-
couragement to adhere to current plans should not be so great that it causes
lower-levels in the organization to stick with an outmoded plan. Never-
theless, there is ample evidence to suggest that without adequate control,
*
planning tends to become a superficial exercise.
Secondly, the control system guards against excessive deviations from
current plans that cause a partial breakdown in coordination within the
organization. As deviations grow larger, the myriad interrelated activities
throughout the organization soon get out of mesh. Furthermore, the cost of
getting a plan back in control (for example, by the use of overtime to re-
cover schedule slippage) eventually may exceed the cost of replanning. The
*
One need not search very far back within the archives of the Defense
Department, for example, to discover past instances where original plans
proved to be wildly unrealistic. Part of this is due to the advanced
technology involved in modern weapons; but at least part of the blame
rests with a system that positively encouraged over-optimistic initial
plans and insufficiently discouraged cost escalations and schedule slippages
These problems have been widely recognized, of course, and many of them
are currently being corrected.
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tighter the control limits, the sooner deviations are detected and the
earlier replanning can take place. Ideally, one would like to set
control limits at the point that balances the cost of poor coordination
against the cost of increasing the frequency of planning. (These costs
may be extraordinarily difficult to estimate in practice, of course.)
Finally, the control system provides feedback data useful for later
planning. These data are used to update the data base of the organization
in order to keep it a more faithful analogue of the real world and thus
provide a better basis for predicting planning data. The control system
should, when feasible, identify sources of (and responsibility for)
deviations from plans in such a way that continual improvement can be
made in the planning process. For example, the system might distinguish
between deviations caused by errors in the basic planning data and those
caused by errors in the planning model.
4. THE HIERARCHICAL NATURE OF PLANNING
4.1 Factoring of Global Objectives
An organization engages in activities aimed at achieving certain over-
all, or global
, objectives. A business firm, for example, may seek such
objectives as a "fair" return on equity capital, "reasonable" growth and
security of earnings, and a "favorable" community image. Determining a
set of detailed actions designed to achieve the organization's global
objectives constitutes a problem-solving task of enormous magnitude.
A problem of such complexity obviously cannot be handled as a single,
monolithic task. The global objectives of the organization must be broken
down, or factored , into more tractable subobjectives . This is done through
a m-^ans -ends analysis that relates the desired end result? --the ravritidirjarsn-
SPi.i**tl.t global objectives --to the means of accomplishing them.
The subobjectives thus generated may, in turn, require further factoring
into still less comprehensive tasks. This process continues until the sub-
tasks become manageable without further (formal) factoring (March and Simon,
1958, pp. 190-193) . Each of the lowest-level subtasks is presumably linked
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to the global objectives through a means -ends chain. In composite, the
chains form an elaborate hierarchical structure of tasks within tasks
within tasks (Newell, Shaw, and Simon, 1959).
The behavior of the organization depends largely on the way in which
the hierarchical factoring is accomplished. Unfortunately, there exists
no known method for doing this in any "optimal" fashion. The structure
of the factoring basically rests on the notion of what constitutes a
"manageable" subactivity. Fragmentation of the organization's global
objectives into a hierarchy of subobjectives inevitably introduces problems
of coordination, and so one would like to make each subactivity as compre-
hensive as the information handling capacity of the organization allows.
4.2 Planning Levels
The factoring of the organization's global objectives is achieved
through hierarchical planning. Each node in the hierarchy constitutes
a single-level planning process. Each of these processes is carried on
subject to various types of goals and constraints. If one process generates
a plan that imposes a goal or constraint on another, then the former is
a higher - level planning process with respect to the latter. This definition
of level is similar to Manheim's (1964, pp. 39-47). According to his
definition (loosely translated), a plan at level B lies below level A if
it partitions the behavior described by plans at level A into finer detail.
A high-level plan can be amplified into two or more consistent but distinct
lower-level plans.
(The number of alternative plans consistent with the high-level plan
provides a useful conceptual measure of planning centralization: If the
high-level plan imposes severe constrains that allow relatively few options,
th^n that stage of the planning hierarchy can be viewed as being relatively
centralized; if the high-level plan leaves a great many options, the process
at that stage is decentralized (Emery, 1964, pp. 10-16).)
Thus, a one-to-many transformation exists between a high-level plan
and its lower-level plans. It is the responsibility of lower-level planners
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to perform this transformation in a way that maintains consistency between
levels. If this is done, the complete set of plans throughout the organi-
zation constitutes a hierarchical description of intended behavior. Plans
at all levels describe portions of the same total behavior, but the precision
of the description increases as high-level plans are amplified into lower-
level plans
.
In the process of elaborating higher-level plans, each level in the
planning hierarchy adds information to the description of intended behavior.
Eventually the network (hopefully) describes desired behavior unambiguously
enough to achieve the planned outcomes within reasonable limits. Even at
the lowest planning level, however, plans by no means spell out every
detail. Conceptually, one should continue the hierarchical planning process
until the cost of additional formal planning exceeds the expected marginal
improvement that it brings
.
The increasing precision of specified behavior is manifested by the
hierarchical nature of planning variables. High-level plans are normally
expressed in terms of gross aggregate units and relatively long time periods.
A high-level plan, for example, might deal in quarterly forecasts of major
product lines, or--in the case of the Defense Department--fiscal year esti-
mates of program element costs (e.g., Minuteman missile costs). Subject to
the constraints imposed by higher-level plans, each level in the planning
process typically breaks down higher-level variables into more detailed
variables that extend over shorter time intervals. Thus, a quarterly product
line schedule may be amplified into weekly schedules of individual items,
and program element plans are expanded into much more detailed program
authorizations
.
A high-level plan can constrain lower-level planning in three ways:
1) through goals; 2) through basic planning data; and 3) through procedures.
The specific way in which a constraint impinges on planning depends somewhat
on the computational procedures used by lower-level processes. For example,
an aggregate inventory level set by a high-level planner can be treated as
a parameter in a procedure for allocating inventory subject to an aggregate
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constraint. If the inventory level cannot be handled conveniently as a
parameter, it becomes a goal thf.t the lower-level planner considers in
selecting alternative plans,
A. 3 Determination of the Goal Hierarchy
The process of factoring global objectives creates a hierarchy of
subobjectives that establishes the basic "charter" of each organizational
unit. A manufacturing department might, for example, be assigned responsi-
bility for manufacturing operations, purchasing, and industrial engineering;
while the sales department is assigned responsibility for marketing and
distribution.
The factoring of global objectives continues until a complex hierarchy
of goals is created (Granger, 1964). One aspect of the hierarchy is as-
sociated with the authority structure of the organization. Each planner
throughout the organization is assigned certain goals that are designed to
induce behavior consistent with higher-level goals (and hence, through
recursion, with the global objectives of the organization)
.
The hierarchy also has a time aspect. The basic objectives of each
organizational must be factored into a hierarchy of goals that are in-
creasingly more definitive and shorter term. In generating these goals,
the planner at each stage is constrained--or perhaps "guided" would be
a less negatively loaded terra--by his longer-range goals. For example,
the basic (but rather ill-defined) objectives of the manufacturing depart-
ment provide a guide for the generation of its "long-range" plan that, in
turn, constrains the preparation of its annual budget. The "constraints"
imposed by longer-range goals may be loose and subject to revision, but
it is difficult to see the purpose they serve unless they play a definite
role in the generation of shorter-term goals.
4 . 4 yenex'atlQn of Mul- .Idimengional Goals
As mentioned earlier, the goals generated at each stage of the factoring
process are normally multidimensional. There are three principal reasons for
this. In the first place, compression of incommensurables reduces the infor-
mation content of the goals assigned to lower-level planners. Unless there
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exists a general concensus about the trade-off between goals --one that is
acceptable for purposes of all ?.ower-level planning and control--then an
arbitrary trade-off function suppresses information that lower-level
planners should have in formulating their own plans. The incommensurable
goals facing a high-level planner must therefore normally be passed down
to lower-level planners in some translated multidimensional form. The
incommensurable global objectives--dealing with profit, esthetics, and
morality, say--thus tend to trickle down through the goal hierarchy.
Suppose, for example, that a plant superintendent is assigned the
goals of reducing costs and preventing accidents. He naturally wants to
assign goals to foremen that will lead to the accomplishment of his own
goals. Conceivably, he could collapse his two goals into a single-
dimensional cost goal by assessing a penalty charge for any accidents that
occur in a foreman's department. However, it is unlikely that a generally
agreed value could (or would) be placed on each type of accident, and an
attempt to do so would blur rather than clarify the planning task of the
foremen.
Secondly, multiple goals are often used as an approximation for a
single "real" goal that cannot be measured in practice. Business profit
provides an example of such a goal. The determination of real profit as
the economist defines it requires the calculation of the present value
of the firm at the beginning and end of the period over which profit is
being measured (Alexander, 1962). This, in turn, requires a knowledge
of future cash flows and a suitable discount rate. Such a goal provides
little guidance for making most short-term planning decisions. In order
to make the profit goal more operationally useful for lower-level planning.
It must be translated into multiple substitute (or surrogate ) goals that
hopefully induce behavior consistent with the "real" goal.
Accounting "profit," for example, provides an operationally measurable
approximation to real profit through a process of matching the revenues
and costs associated with a given activity. This matching typically re-
quires a great many essentially arbitrary allocations of costs and revenues
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among different accounting classifications and time periods. Nevertheless,
the conventions used for this pvirpose offer reasonably well-defined and
operational procedures for calculating "profit."
Profit defined by accounting algorithms depends primarily on past
costs, and therefore may be inconsistent with future profits. In recognition
of this fact, managers are typically held accountable for subsidiary goals
other than Just accounting profit. For instance, each planner may be assigned
certain "position" or "ending status" goals--Likert (1963, pp. 61-62) uses
the term "intervening variables"--expressed in terms of such variables as
market participation, product development expenditures, cost reduction
targets, and employee turnover. These multiple goals are designed to measure
the position (or "salvage value") of the firm at the end of the period for
which profit is being determined. By means of these goals, the planner
receives an early reading on the status of the organization--its ability
to generate future profits --and therefore he need not wait until the future
reveals the effects of current decisions. Subsidiary goals thus provide
a feedback loop having a much shorter time delay than an "end result" goal
*
such as profit (Ashby, 1956, pp. 221-225).
Finally, multiple goals are sometimes generated as a means of coping
with interactions among the subunits of an organization. It is often not
possible to devise a single goal that embodies all of the relevant factors
and interacting effects that a lower-level planner should consider in
*
Position variables used as organizational goals serve the same purpose
as they do in certain other types of problem-solving situations. For example,
in the game of checkers or chess, the astronomical number of alternatives
precludes an exhaustive tracing of every chain of moves to the completion of
the game. Instead, the player (or a heuristic program) traces a selected
chain of moves until he encounters a relatively stable position. He must at
this point assess the relative merits of the resulting position in order to
evaluate the sequence of moves that led to it (Samuel, 1959).
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selecting a plan among the alternatives available. It may therefore be
necessary to use multiple goals in order to convey sufficient information
about desired behavior in the face of interactions.
Suppose, for example, that the president of a company wishes to assign
goals to the vice-president of manufacturing that will lead to a satisfactory
accounting profit. Certainly a single -dimension profit goal cannot be used,
*
since he shares this responsibility with other departments. Even though
the manufacturing department may be primarily concerned with costs, it also
affects sales revenues through such means as product quality and stock
availability. Therefore, the vice-president cannot be held responsible
only for costs; he must also meet quality and delivery goals. By such
means, a high-level planner can factor his activities into subactivities
having goals that recognize the more important interactions (Whinston,
1962, pp. VI 33-49).
A. 5 The Behavior Induced by Assigned Goals
The organization must assume that each planner will take his goals
seriously by attempting to "optimize" in terms of the goals assigned him.
This is true whether or not the resulting behavior in fact contributes
to the success of the organization as a whole. Thus, if a sales manager
is held responsible solely for sales volume, he may strive for increased
dollar sales even at the expense of reduced corporate profit (by granting
too many price concessions to customers, for example). A planner, like
the magic genie, is apt to interpret literally; and the organization must
expect to get exactly what it asks for.
(One must, of course, distinguish between formal and effective goals:
the organization may adopt a set of stated goals which may or may not be
th^ effective ones. The real goals are those that receive emphasis in the
complex reward and punishment structure of the organization. A plant
Manufacturing "profit" can be computed by use of transfer prices,
but in most cases this requires the specification of an essentially arbitrary
figure. Under some circumstances, however, "shadow" prices that reflect
current marginal costs can be used as a tool of resource allocation among
interacting activities (Arrow, 1959)
.
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superintendent may profess interest in good housekeeping, but if he bases
all promotions and Christmas bonuses only on manufacturing costs, then
he should not be too surprised if a foreman pays scant attention to the
tidiness of his department. Similarly, if a president punishes his vice-
presidents for their every failure, then he will breed extreme conservatism
within the firm despite any amount of exhortation about the need for in-
itiative and willingness to take justified risks.)
The choice of goals that lead to desirable behavior is by no means
a trivial issue. For most purposes of planning and control it is necessary
to express goals in an operational form that permits quantification of plans
and measurement of results (Haberstroh, 1958, pp. 69-70). Non-quantitative
goals are, of course, also employed; but quantified goals tend to drive
out, in Gresham-like fashion, all other goals. Thus, college deans may
find it easier to justify faculty promotions based on the number of research
publications then on the quality of teaching.
A goal may not always be amenable to quantification. "High employee
morale" and "effective research" may be laudable goals, but they are diffi-
cult to measure. In such cases, the organization must resort to the use
of goal surrogates that presumably approximate the real goals (in the sense
that the surrogates induce behavior consistent with the real goals) . For
example, morale may be gauged by the number of grievances filed by the
union, and research effectiveness may be measured by the number of patent '
disclosures
.
The use of measurable goal surrogates is essential, but it also carries
some obvious hazards. The variables employed may not, in fact, be closely
correlated to real goals, and therefore the resulting behavior need not be
desirable in terms of real goals. For example, a foreman may be induced to
browbeat employees or to make under-the-table deals with them so that they
will not file formal grievances, and the research director may be induced
to work on trivial projects offtiring the sole merit 'of a high probability
of yielding a patent disclosure. Distortions of this sort cannot be avoided
altogether, but a judicious selection of goal variables can mitigate their
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undesirable effects .
As a partial solution to this problem, a planner may be assigned goals
having upper and lower limits . The lower limit might represent performance
considered attainable with a high probability. It can therefore serve as
a standard of minimum acceptable performance and as a basis for all other
planning throughout the organization. A cash budget, for example, could
be developed on the assumption that all units will at least meet their
minimum profit goal.
The upper limit under this scheme provides a standard of superior
performance --a goal the planner must stretch to reach. Performance "better"
than the upper limit would not be encouraged, since the planner might other-
wise be induced to devote an undue amount of resources and effort to one
goal at the expense of his other goals (Schleh, 1961, pp. 32-36). Thus,
an upper limit on manufacturing quality would encourage the foreman to
strive for "high," but not "excessive," quality.
4.6 Hierarchical Planning Constraints
Each single-level planning process must recognize the availability
of such resources as capital equipment, managerial talent, manpower,
material, and energy. Instead of "congealed" physical resources, a planner
may be granted a flexible resource in the form of an aggregate money con-
straint (which of course congeals upon use) . These resources are made
available through a hierarchy of earlier planning decisions. The current
amount of each available resource is reflected in the basic planning data
used as capacity constraints in lower-level planning.
Information constitutes the raw material for planning. Each planner
is constrained not on the basis of the "true" state of the environment,
but rather on the perceived state as represented in the data base available
to him. The data base may or may not provide a suitable analogue of the
environment; the data it contains are certainly subject to errors, delays,
and transformations of varying usefulness.
Higher- level planning partially governs lower-level planning by means
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of the information it makes available. For example, the organization em-
ploys uncertainty absorption- -ir which variables subject to uncertainty
are communicated as stipulated facts --as a way of achieving some direction
and consistency over lower-level planning (March and Simon, 1958, p. 165).
Transfer prices provide another means for guiding lower -level planning.
Technical knowledge represents a special kind of information. Although
the fund of technical knowledge is by no means completely controllable by
the organization, it is certainly subject to some control through the
organization's allocation of resources to research and development activi-
ties.
Performance programs of one form or another are used by the organi-
zation to govern lower-level planning. Constraints on planning can be
imposed through a hierarchy of standing plans, standard operating procedures,
policies, and computational algorithms (March and Simon, 1958, pp. 141-150).
4.7 Adaptation Through Hierarchical Planning
Conceptually, the hierarchy of planning can continue indefinitely.
Every single-level planning process is subject to constraints of one sort
or another (including the constraints implied by goals) . These constraints
are imposed by higher-level processes that are themselves subject to con-
straints. For example, the generation of an inventory plan is subject to
constraints imposed by the particular computational algorithms used. The
search for improved algorithms involves planning--the comparison of alterna-
tive procedures and the selection of the best one. This planning is in
turn subject to constraints. An operations research group developing
inventory procedures is constrained by its organizational structure, goals,
resource budget, information, policies, and procedures. One can develop
recursively still higher-level planning processes (procedures to change
procedures to change procedures, say).
The organization can improve its behavior by making appropriate
adjustments to the planning constraints through a continual process of
hierarchical adaptation. The adjustments should normally be "small" in

32
order to increase the stability of planning. To the extent that the organi-
zation can discern the effects of changes, those adjustments that bring
improvements can be continued and strengthened, and those that worsen be-
havior can be rescinded.
The frequency of these adjustments varies with hierarchical level.
A high-level constraint--8uch as organization structure and goals--requires
infrequent changes, while low-level procedures may be revised relatively
often (Simon, 1962, p. 477). Each execution of a planning cycle provides
little evidence for making changes in the process, especially in the
presence of random variations. Since high-level planning ordinarily has
a relatively long cycle time, changes in high-level planning constraints
*
should be correspondingly infrequent. The stability thus provided con-
tributes to the predictability of behavior and allows time for persons
within the organization to learn their jobs and specialize their activities
(Zannetos, 1965).
The notion that adaptation comes through changes in the planning
process has exceedingly important implications for management. If a
manager hopes to exert a lasting and fundamental Influence over the be-
havior of the organization, he must work primarily through planning.
He should not focus attention on ad hoc adjustments to plans, but rather
on the process that generates the plans (and with the process that generated
that process)
.
5. INTERACTIONS AMONG PLANNING PROCESSES
5.1 Means of Achieving Partial Independence
The factoring of the total planning task into a hierarchy of single-level
*
The situation is perhaps analogous to nested loops In a computer
program. The loop index of an outer loop is changed less frequently than
the indices of the inner loops that it controls
.
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processes is only justified on the grounds that it makes the global ob-
jectives more manageable; if the task were manageable without factoring,
it would not be factored. In order to reap the benefit of the simplifi-
cations introduced by this fragmentation, each planning process must be
largely isolated from the rest. Without partial independence, a planner
would require access to detailed information about all other activities
with which his activity interacts, and in effect he would have to handle
the global problem.
Despite the need for independence, interactions among activities
are a fact of life; they exist universally in organizations composed of
hierarchical subunits pursuing a common set of global objectives. They
arise through elaborate couplings of material, energy, and information
flowing between units; through the allocation of scarce common resources;
and through effects on a common environment. The organization must there-
fore find some way of coping with interactions.
The organization structure itself has a major effect on the degree
of independence among subunits. In general, closely interacting activi-
ties should be hierarchically "close" to each other. For example, the
foremen of the assembly and shipping departments might report to the
same supervisor. This reduces the amount of coordination required across
hierarchical lines, and thus partially insulates each unit from other
parts of the organization.
Unfortunately, this principle often conflicts with other aims, and
one must strike a balance among them in establishing hierarchical structure.
For example, a project (or purpose ) organizational structure in its purest
form assigns to a single branch of the hierarchy all of the tasks, and
only those tasks, connected with an independent objective. This provides
a high degree of independence. Alternatively, a functional (or process )
organizational structure combines complementary activities that serve
multiple purposes--all of the electrical engineering work associated with
several different development projects, for instance. A functional structure
typically allows a relatively high degree of specialization, with considerable
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attendant efficiencies. It does this, however, at the possible cost of
assigning closely interacting t?sks to different branches of the organi-
zational tree, thereby increasing the amount of coordination required
across hierarchical lines.
The effects of interactions can also be reduced by partially decoupling
closely related activities. This is accomplished by the standardization
"of the interfaces between units (for example, by the specification of material
specifications or data formats); by the use of buffer inventories to provide
a short-term cushion between the rate of production of a supplying unit
and the rate of consumption of a using unit; and by providing each unit
with excess resources in order to increase the probability of meeting its
scheduled interface output requirements (March and Simon, 1958, pp. 158-160).
Each of these decoupling devices creates greater short-term independence
among subunits. This independence provides a partial cushion for the myriad
random disturbances that impinge on the subunits. The organization is thus
rendered less sensitive to uncertainty, since each subunit can absorb minor
ripples in random variables without transmitting their effects to other
parts of the organization.
Achieving greater independence among subunits obviously has a price:
combining related activities may result in forgone opportunities for
specialization; tighter tolerances increase manufacturing costs; buffer
inventories take money to acquire and maintain; and slack resources reduce
capital and labor utilization. Furthermore, significant interactions will
persist despite all efforts to increase independence by means of the organi-
zational structure or decoupling devices? complete independence is impossible
to attain and expensive to approach.
In the presence of the remaining interactions, each action taken in
one subunit has almost endless ramifications throughout the rest of the
organization. A planner faces an impossible and costly task if he attempts
to trace all such effects. Fortunately, he need not try. He can simply
ignore interactions--or at least the vast bulk of them.
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For example, a production planner can often schedule his department
without detailed consideration of the effects of his actions on others.
He relies on other planners to cope within their own departments with such
unfavorable effects as varying labor requirements, machine capacity limi-
tations, and shortages of raw materials. He thus artificially isolates
himself to a considerable extent by basing his plans on the fiction that
most of the interactions with the other departments do not exist. The
partitioning and decoupling of the activities within the organization
should be such that this fiction represents a legitimate and useful ap-
proximation of reality.
Ignoring interactions has the undeniable advantage of greatly simpli-
fying the task of each individual planner. However, failure to consider
important interactions carries the well-known (but often overlooked) penalties
of suboptimization--the achievement of local subgoals inconsistent with
the global goals of the organization (Hitch and McKean, 1960, pp. 128-131
and 158 and 181) . A schedule that appears attractive to the assembly
section may, for example, cause extreme bottlenecks in some of the sub-
assembly departments. An obvious need exists for coordinating the activi-
ties of separate subunits in a way that recognizes such effects.
5 .2 Coordination Throush Plans
Coordination of interacting activities within the organization repre-
sents one of the primary aims of planning. Significant interactions must
be considered in generating plans so that the resulting behavior of each
unit will be consistent both with higher-level goals and with the activi-
ties of other units.
A high-level planner should recognize the more important interactions
that occur among his lower-levei units. For example, a plant scheduler
should take into account existing capacity limitations within the various
departments of the plant. In selecting a given schedule, he must try to
allocate available capacity in a way that serves the best interest of the
organization as a whole, rather than that of any single lower-level unit.
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He may not consider the detailed ramifications of his allocation decisions,
bt:t he should at least handle the significant aggregate effects .
The result of a compromise among conflicting objectives is communicated
to lower-level planners In the form of an aggregate high-level- plan. If
the high-level plan is a "good" one, suboptlmlzatlon within the constraints
it imposes introduces only insignificant penalties. Thus, communication
between levels is typically confined to aggregate variables. This provides
a means of recognizing Important interactions, while at the same time
allowing each planner to formulate his plans without considering the de-
*
tailed actions of others.
Even if it is infeaslble to formulate higher-level plans that ex-
plicitly consider all Important interactions simultaneously, lower-level
planners should still have some information about the expected behavior
of closely related units. For example, it may not be possible to determine
an "optimum" plant-wide schedule, but a subassembly planner must know the
assembly schedule before he can establish his own schedule. In other words,
even if the magnitude of the task prevents a higher- level planner from
treating lower-level actions as variables, a lower-level planner should at
least formulate his own plans with some knowledge about the value of the
interface variables through which he Interacts with other units
.
Plans in their various forms provide the basic source of information
for predicting the actions of others . This is true of both standing and
single-use plans. Standing plans--in the broadest sense, policies, pro-
cedures, and all other types of programmed activlty--play much the same
role as habit in biological organisms. They provide organizational stability,
*
The organization constitutes a nearly decomposable system (Simon,
1962, pp. 473-477). In such a system, each component is approximately
independent of other components, and those interactions that do exist
largely depend on aggregate, rather than detailed, variables.
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and thus Increase the accuracy with which one unit can predict the be-
havior of another. This allows a unit to formulate its own plan based
on an assumed or provisional level of activity in other parts of the
organization. The plan may then require iterative modification if the
predicted behavior of other units proves to be significantly in error.
Single-use plans describe explicitly the anticipated activity of
the units included in the plans. They are transmitted to appropriate
planners throughout the organization as a basis for their own planning.
Even though the plans give only an abstract description of behavior, their
precision is normally sufficient for each planner to estimate the value of
his interface variables. This is so because the interactions among distinct
units are generally governed by aggregate, not detailed, behavior--other-
wise the activities should be combined into a single unit.
5.3 The Need for Higher-Level Constraints in Dealing with Interactions
The strong downward bias of planning in the presence of Interactions
suggests that the more critical issues are resolved at the higher-level
planning stages, and that the success of the organization depends less and
less on plans generated at lower and lower levels. If this were not the
case, the lowest levels could plan their own destiny unconstrained by higher-
*
level considerations.
*
In a purely competitive economy, interactions are resolved in the
market place. Adam Smith's "invisible hand," acting through the price
mechanism, provides the "higher -level" constraints within which each firm
attempts to optimize. If significant interactions --or externalities --
exist, then prices alone do not contain enough information to achieve an
efficient allocation of resources (in the Pareto sense) . Additional infor-
mation might be provided, for exaimple, by a central planning agency that
assigns production quotas. But even if this "solution" were politically
acceptable, the technical and computational problems involved make it
infeasible under most circumstances.
The transfer prices associated with the movement of goods within a
single firm serve an analogous role. They also suffer from the same short-
comings. Within the firm, however, interactions are likely to be relatively
more significant, and higher- level planning as a means of coping with them
becomes more feasible.
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The notion of the relative superiority of high-level plans seemingly
conflicts with a popular view that an organization's total behavior is
governed by the behavior of its lowest- level units. "For want of a nail,
a kingdom was lost." "The Army is governed by its sergeants." "Take care
of the pence, for the pounds will take care of themselves." These aphorisms
ascribe the success or failure of the organization to its lowest levels.
It is true that the behavior of the organization does ultimately depend
on the composite activity at its lowest levels. However, if the organi-
zation as a whole is to achieve purposeful behavior in the face of inter-
actions, lower-level activity must be guided by a hierarchy of higher-level
planning constraints. Otherwise, lower-level success tends to be local
rather than global. The want of a nail may--although it is highly unlikely--
cause the loss of a kingdom, but the best way to reduce this risk is to
develop an improved inventory control system. Generals may organize logistic
operations; they do not serve as blacksmiths.
Regardless of an organization's commitment to decentralization, higher-
level planners inevitably impose constraints on lower-level planning. They
do this through the specification of organizational structure and resources,
goals, policies, procedures, programmed behavior, transfer prices, and
various informal and unstated requirements. These constraints are designed
to induce lower-level behavior that is consistent with the means-ends de-
composition of global objectives.
To be sure, planning information has an upward as well as a doi^nward
flow. A higher-level plan may seemingly be generated merely as a composite
of lower-level plans. However, even in extreme cases the higher-level
planner has some power of veto over the proposed plans submitted to him.
This represents a potent instrument for guiding lower-level planning, as
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Secretary McNamara has demonstrated.
6. CONSISTENCY AND ITERATIVE PLANNING
As we have seen, a high-level plan inevitably imposes constraints on
lower-level planning. The plans generated at the lower level in turn con-
strain still lower-level planning. This process continues down to the most
detailed plan. It is the detailed plan that guides behavior during the
actual execution of a hierarchy of plans.
A higher-level plan thus affects actual behavior only indirectly
through lower-level planning. The plan induces intended behavior only
if lower-level plans are consistent with it, since the lowest-level plan
shapes behavior whether or not it is consistent with higher-level con-
straints. The organization must therefore rely on hierarchical consistency
in order to achieve purposeful behavior directed toward the accomplishment
of its global objectives.
Consistency must also be maintained across hierarchical lines. The
interdependent nature of organizations makes it essential that significant
conflicts should not arise between interacting plans. For example, the
resource inputs and outputs incorporated in the plans of a manufacturing
department should mesh in quantity and time phasing with the plans of the
A planner with veto power acts, in effect, as a trainer, exercising
his authority through selective reinforcement of lower- level behavior.
He rewards a planning process by accepting its output, and extinguishes
a process by rejecting its plans (Minsky, 1963, pp. 426-430). This mecha-
nism offers the distinct advantage of not requiring the higher-level planner
to have detailed knowledge of lower-level activities; he must only possess
a means of distinguishing "acceptable" from "unacceptable" plans. Its great
disadvantage is that it may be a much less efficient method of guiding lower-
level behavior than more direct intervention. With only one-bit go, no-go
information, lower-level units iriay move very slowly--if at all--toward im-
proved planning. In practice, of course, additional information is provided
in the form of specific requests for modifications to plans, veto messages
and so forth.
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purchasing, personnel, and sales departments. The generation of a set of
plans meeting all consistency requirements represents one of the major
difficulties of planning.
A lower-level plan may fall within the constraints imposed by higher-
level plans while still conflicting with other plans outside its own hier-
archy. Higher-level constraints generally allow considerable flexibility
in lower-level planning. Two different plans may therefore appear equally
satisfactory in terms of high-level aggregate variables, but they may differ
in their compatibility with the plans of other organizational units.
One would obviously like to devise higher- level plans such that hier-
archical consistency also provides adequate universal consistency. If this
is not the case--if higher-level goals and formal policies, procedures, and
operating plans do not induce consistency throughout the organization--then
*
consistency must be achieved through informal means. Universal consistency
may require the specification of essentially arbitrary higher-level con-
straints, such as a schedule of staggered lunch periods for all units within
a plant
.
Consistency among plans requires realistic planning and a control system
that encourages compliance with plans. Without these, no logical assurance
exists that consistency can or will be achieved. Conceivably, a higher-level
plan may be completely infeasible, and therefore no feasible lower-level plan
can be consistent with it.
Realism in planning can be achieved in two ways . The most common ap-
proach is to generate plans that differ only modestly from previous plans
formulated under similar conditions. The continuity thus provided enormously
simplifies high-level planning, since it permits the formulation of plans
*
Consistency is always ultimately achieved at the execution stage,
but perhaps at unacceptably high cost--by shutting down a production
line for lack of requisitioned material, for example.
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with a minimum amount of infojrmation- -namely, information about past per-
formance and the significant internal or external changes that have occurred
subsequently (Cyert and March, 1963, pp. 111-112). (Determining the impli-
cations of such changes may be exceedingly difficult, however.)
Unfortunately, such conservatism bars the possibility of obtaining
really fundamental improvements. To overcome this disadvantage, the
planner must make a more far-reaching search for improved plans. To achieve
realism with this more radical approach, the planner can no longer rely
principally on information about past performance; he must have access to
a much larger source of information in order to determine the probable con-
sequences of untried plans.
In order to formulate a realistic plan, a high-level planner must be
able to assess the detailed implications of different alternatives. Normally,
the information handling capacity available to him precludes such analysis,
because otherwise it would be unnecessary to fragment the total planning
task into lower-level components. He must therefore choose a plan without
detailed consideration of the lower-level plans used to implement it. Thus,
strategists can only assume "reasonable" performance on the part of tacticians
In conformity with higher-level constraints (Starr, 1964, pp. 67-75).
Ignoring details can often lead to significantly unrealistic plans.
Within the limits of his available information handling capacity, a high-
level planner must therefore find a means of generating plans that consider
detailed matters. This can be done most efficiently through an iterative
dialogue with lower-level planners.
The iterative cycle starts with the formulation of a high-level pre-
liminary plan. With this plan as a guide, lower-level planners propose plans
which they consider realistic (perhaps as a result of proposalj submitted
to them by planners at still lower levels). The higher-level planner may
modify such proposals, but hopefully in a way that does not do violence to
their realism. The iterative process continues until "convergence" is achieved
within required tolerances.
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The great advantage of the iterative scheme is that it provides an
efficient means of transferring planning information between hierarchical
levels. On the one hand, a lower-level planner receives information by
means of a provisional high-level plan. He can therefore confine his
search for a detailed plan to those alternatives that appear consistent
with higher-level goals. A high-level planner, on the other hand, receives
information about detailed factors submerged from his view at the time he
formulates his provisional plan. Upon closer lower-level scrutiny, a plan
that appeared attractive in terms of the low-resolution, high-level planning
model may be revealed to be unrealistic in some respect.
Often the iterative nature of planning is not made explicit. In order
to generate realistic plans through an explicit iterative process, lower-
level planners have the responsibility to point out unrealistic aspects of
higher-level plans. If the planning system is strongly biased against an
upward flow of information, the organization will end up with unrealistic
high-level plans and inconsistent lower-level plans. The lower levels may
bury the inconsistencies by an elaborate shuffling of their resources, by
bookkeeping slight-of-hand, or by postponing as long as possible the inevi-
table exception report of deviations from the higher-level plan. When the
deviations finally do come to light, an inordinate amount of bureaucratic
effort may go into a quest for excuses and alibis.
Budgeting in the Defense Department illustrates the concept of iterative
planning. The first step in the cycle involves the specification of preliminary
budget "guidelines" for each of the military services. These guidelines are
not intended to impose strict constraints on lower-level budgeting, but they
do reflect basic military, political, and economic policy decisions regarding
*
The issue is of course not as clear-cut as I might seem to imply.
A lower-level planner obviously has his own biases, and probably they
do not run in favor of a plan that presses him too energetically, A cer-
tain amount of gaming takes place when planners negotiate. Stedry dis-
cusses some of the issues involved (Stedry, 1962).
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the general level of defense activity that is to be supported.
The military services budget their more detailed activities within
the loose constraints imposed by the guidelines. The resulting proposed
budgets may exceed the preliminary estimate, but presumably not by an
unreasonable amount. The final budget is ultimately reached through a
complicated series of iterative negotiations (Burkhead, 1956, pp. 88-94),
7. GEOMETRIC INTERPRETATION OF HIERARCHICAL PLANNING
It Is useful, I think, to give a geometric interpretation to planning
(Sisson, 1960, pp. 113-115; Manheira, 1964). In such terms, a composite
lowest-level plan constitutes a point in an n-dimensional abstract space
*
containing all alternative plans open to the organization. Each detailed
decision or outcome variable used to describe a plan (including those
variables used to measure the uncertainty of the plan) represents a dimension
of this space.
Every point has an associated utility value, a function of the variables
that serve to define the point. The mapping into the utility value is, in
general, many-to-one: two or more points may be indistinguishable from the
standpoint of the goals of the planner.
A high-level plan defines a relatively large set of points that are
consistent with its specified aggregate, low-resolution variables. In general,
not all points included in such a set have the same utility. Therefore, a
high-level plan typically does not have a single utility value, but rather a
distribution of values (Manheim, 1964, p. 48).
*
The plan space does not include all "real" alternatives, but only
those that can be described in terms of the abstract variables used in
formulating plans. '
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The utility ultimately achieved depends on the way in which a high-
level plan is elaborated into the lowest-level plans, and typically this
information is not available to the high-level planner at the time he
selects a plan. He must therefore make a choice (probably not consciously)
on the basis of a subjective estimate of the probability distribution of
utility values (or their parameters) associated with each alternative high-
level plan. The hierarchical planning process then successively narrows
down the set of points remaining in the region constrained by higher-level
plans. Ultimately there remains only a single point having a single utility
value (but which reflects, of course, the probabilistic nature of outcomes
and the planner's attitude toward risk and uncertainty).
The point finally selected in the abstract plan space guides the
actual execution of the plan. Certain actions and outcomes are induced
as a result of this guidance. The control system measures these actions
and outcomes, and translates them into the abstract variables used in
planning. In general, the "actual" point will not coincide with the planned
point, since neither actions nor outcomes will necessarily occur as planned.
This should be recognized in the control system by allowing some tolerance
for deviations from the plan. Thus, a deviation is treated as significant
only if the actual point falls outside & region surrounding the planned
point.
A simple example will clarify these geometric concepts. Suppose that
an organization has a three-level planning process. The highest level fixes
the "budget." Production and marketing "plans" are then generated at the
intermediate level, consistent with the higher-level budget. Finally, at
the lowest level detailed "schedules" are formulated to implement the plans.
Assume that plans at all levels can be described in temu. of only two
dimensions, "sales" and "profit." However, a lower-level plan extends over
a shorter time span than the corresponding higher-level plan. Thus confined
to two dimensions, we can represent a composite schedule as a point in a
plane. A higher-level plan is represented by a region containing the set
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of points consistent with its plan variables. This is shown in Fig. 2.
Profit
Budget B2
^'
/
/
i
Budget Bi
Sales
Fig. 2 - Geometric Representation of Hierarchical Planning
A given budget includes only certain portions of the total plan space.
Points outside this region cannot be reached within the constraints imposed
by the budget. In Fig. 2, for example, budget B restricts the set of points
to the region surrounded by the solid curve labeled B . A different budget,
B , has associated with it a different region, the one included within the
broken curve. Suppose that the highest-level planner chooses budget B over
budget B
,
presumably because he perceives it to include a more satisfactory
set of points as measured by the distribution of utility values associated
with each set
.
Intermediate planning further narrows the region of alternative schedules
available to the organization. In order to be consistent with budget B , the
points included within the feasible region of the production and marketing plan
Fig. 2 is similar to Manheim's representation of hierarchical planning
(1964, p. 21).
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must all lie within region B . Scheduling, the final steps in the planning
process, then selects a point within the region constrained by this plan.
Consistency among hierarchical plans has an obvious geometric repre-
sentation. For a plan to be perfectly consistent with a higher-level plan,
it must lie wholly within the region of the latter. Therefore, a set of
consistent hierarchical plans is represented by a set of nested regions
and a point In the innermost region associated with the most detailed plan.
A higher-level region serves merely to confine the next lower-level region,
which in turn confines the next region, and so on down to the most detailed
plan. It is this detailed plan that guides behavior during the actual exe-
cution of a hierarchy of plans.
Because of the aggregate, low-resolution nature of high-level planning,
a high-level planner does not know the precise set of points implied by a
given plan. He may, in fact, select a high-level plan that is totally in-
feasible, or one that has unsuspected and undesirable consequences. In
general, the high-level planner cannot include sufficient information within
his planning model to guard against all possibility of overlooking important
factors. He must therefore rely on iterative modifications of his plan to
eliminate significant distortions caused by his gross model.
The total planning process involves a hierarchical search through the
organization's plan space . The highest-level planning model deals in ag-
gregates and gross approximations , and therefore the space of its perceived
alternatives is very much smaller than that of the composite lower-level
models. (It is, however, still enormous and largely unfathomable.) Within
this space, the high-level planner employs a sequential search in order to
locate a region having a high utility (at least in terms of the variables
used in high-level planning) . Vhe success of the search process rests on
the usefulness of information acquired through preceding probes of the space
in directing the planner to regions with improved outcomes.
The highest-level plan selected by the planner in this sequential
fashion confines the next lower-level search to a tiny fraction of the total
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plan space. Within this highly restricted region, the planner again employs
a sequential search process to locate a still smaller region having attractive
outcomes. This hierarchical process continues down to the lowest level. Each
level slashes the remaining search region by a high factor, reducing the total
plan space exponentially.
The hierarchical search process makes the total planning task both
feasible and efficient by permitting each planner to concentrate on relatively
small and independent aspects of the global problem. The use of a sequential
search adds to the efficiency of the process, since each probe furnishes infor-
mation useful for making further probes. The iterative nature of the process
allows higher-level planning to deal with aggregate factors, on' the assumption
that any significant issues submerged from view of the high-level models will
be revealed by the more detailed lower-level models.
8. THE ADVANTAGES OF FORMAL PLANNING
The amount of resources devoted to the planning function represents
one of the most fundamental decisions facing the organization. The organi-
zation has a wide choice in the degree of formality of its planning, the
detail of information handled, the approximations used in planning models,
the length of the planning horizon and the number of alternatives considered
at each planning stage.
The decision is a vital one. Increased formal planning can, on the one
hand, lead to improved behavior directed toward the accomplishment of the
organization's global goals. On the other hand, increased planning adds to
the cost of data collection, data transmission, computation, and--often the
most significant factor--the cost of designing the planning system. A planner
must balance these two conflicting effects in establishing an appropriate
system.
Virtually every organization of any size engages in some formal planning,
and no organization plans everything in the most minute detail. For any
given subactivity, however, a choice exists as to whether or not a formal
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plan will be used. In the absence of a formal plan, an Informal one is
generated concurrently in "real time" as actual events take place. At the
very least, some planning occurs in the minds of those participating in
the activity. In the following discussion, the planning I refer to is of
the formal type.
Planning represents a "dry run" of organizational activities prior
to their actual execution, and can thus be viewed as a form of simulation.
From this simulation process emerges a network of plans that describes
desired behavior on the part of all units within the organizaion. With
the plans as a guide, then, the organization carries on activities that
(hopefully) result in desirable outcomes.
One must justify formal planning on the grounds that the outcomes
reached by this indirect route are somehow superior to the results that
would be achieved without such planning. Although the logic of making
decisions is very much the same in simulated time as it is in real time,
the simulated world has at least three distinct advantages. Let me ex-
amine them.
.'• 8.1 Access to Increased InfonnatlonllandlinR Gppaclty • .^
The ability of a person to manage an activity in the absence of a
formal plan is severely restricted by his limited information handling
capability. The relatively low capacity of his human sensory channels limits
his ability to perceive the current state of the environment. His infor-
mation storage is slow and unreliable. His modest computing power permits
him to deal with only simple mental images of the real world. Furthermore,
without a plan he is closely tied to real events, and his limited computing
rate imposes a constraint on his ability to analyze a current situation:
Time moves inexorably forward; it cannot be stopped to allow for additional
gathering and processing of information before he must make an urgent decision.
A formal planner has available much greater information handling capacity.
He is not limited to his own human facilities, but can draw upon various compu-
tational procedures and information handling equipment. As a result, the
planner can develop and manipulate formal models that take into account a
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great number of interacting variables. His behavior can therefore be based
on a much more comprehensive picture of the world than the myopic view of
the non-planner.
Because the planner lives in a simulated world, he has much greater
access to essential information about his (imaginary) environment than does
his non-planning counterpart. Simulated time moves as the planner directs.
The time required to make a decision about a simulated event bears no relation
to the time required to execute it --the two are not coupled. Therefore, a
planner is constrained not by his instantaneous information processing rate,
but rather by the total available processing capacity over the required
planning response time.
The modest information handling capacity available to the non-planner
limits his ability to make predictions about the future. The formal planner
suffers from no such limitations: in the simulated world, the timing of an
event can be specified. (The degree of correspondence between these simulated
events and later real events is, of course, another matter, and represents
the ultimate test of the usefulness of planning.) Because the planner can
view the simulated future with precision, he can incorporate in a plan the
earlier steps required to implement desired events. It is, in fact, the
sole aim of the planner to determine current actions that are consistent
with anticipated future actions (Drucker, 1964, pp. 8-9). In the absence
of planning, allowance cannot be made for the lead times required to ac-
*
complijih all of the antecedent steps.
8.2 Generation of Alternatives .
The second advantage of planning is that simulated history is not
irrevocable: The moving finger writes; and, having writ, may be cancelled.
*
Experimental results in physical control systems demonstrate
dramatically the importance of anticipating future actions (Sheridan,
et. al., 1964)
.
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A planner can simply discard an alternative that fails to satisfy his goals,
and can continue to generate plsns until he finds it advantageous to stop.
The final plan that emerges from this process must, of course, be
chosen from the set of alternatives considered. Therefore, with a given
planning process, the larger the number of alternatives evaluated, the better
the final plan selected. The search for improved plans is subject to di-
minishing marginal returns, however, and eventually the cost of further search
exceeds the expected gain.
8.3 Simulation in an Abstract Space .
The third advantage of planning is that it deals with an abstraction
that greatly facilitates the process of searching for desirable outcomes.
The variables used in planning furnish only the barest outline of the real
world. The vast bulk of variables are omitted altogether or aggregated with
other variables, most interactions are ignored, and functional relationships
are greatly simplified. The resulting abstract model of the real world may
be embodied in a formal mathematical or computer language or in such form
as the conventional budgeting model.
The usefulness of these abstractions depends on the fulfillment of
two requirements: First, the planner must find the abstract world somehow
more congenial to fommulating satisfactory plans than he does the real world;
and, second, a satisfactory plan in the abstract world must translate into a
satisfactory plan in the real world.
The first requirement offers no great problem. The real world is, by
design, abstracted in a way and to a degree that allows the planner to manipu-
late the resulting model with relative ease. Within the abstract world, then,
the planner searches for a satisfactory plan by whatever means seem appropriate,
In particular, he might compute an "optimum" plan if his abstract model permits
the application of available optimization techniques (and if it is optimal to
compute the "optimum")
.
The second requirement presents more serious difficulties . The success
of a plan hinges on whether it leads to satisfactory performance judged in
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"real" terms. The planner, in developing his abstraction of the real world,
attempts to achieve a close correspondence between performance predicted by
a plan and the resulting behavior in the real world. Only if his model
passes this test will a "good" plan necessarily lead to "good" behavior.
*
This is by no means a simple requirement.
The correspondence between a plan and the ultimate outcome achieved
depends on three factors: the realism of the planning model used to generate
the plan, the accuracy with which basic planning data are predicted, and the
fidelity with which the plan is carried out.
A planning model is realistic to the extent that the transformation
of decisions into outcomes, when measured in terms of the abstract planning
variables, is the same in both the model and the real world. The relation
between the planning model and the real world is diagrammed in Fig. 3.
Abstract
DecivS^m -
Varia^^les
One -to-Many
Transformation
Real
Actions
MODEL
REAL
WORLD
Abstract
--Outcome
Variables
Many- to -One
Transformation
Real
Outcome
It might be added parenthetically that planning in an organization
plays precisely the same role as planning in a heuristic program (Minsky,
1963, pp. 441-443). In both cases, an inductive transformation first takes
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Ideally, the model should represent a homomorphism of the real world.
If it does, a one-to-many transformation exists between any given plan (as
described by a specific state of the model) and a set of detailed real
actions that are consistent with the plan. The resulting real outcomes
stemming from the alternative real actions will all have the same outcomes
in terras of the variables used in the abstract model.
The second factor affecting the correspondence between a plan and the
eventual real outcome is the accuracy achieved in predicting values of the
basic planning data used in the planning model. Because of prediction
errors, a model may provide a perfect structural homomorphism of the real
world and yet fail to predict outcomes. This problem can be mitigated by
increasing the accuracy of prediction through the use of more elaborate
computation or by having more detailed and timely information; by maintaining
a control system that quickly detects significant deviations from the most
recent predictions; or, if the other approaches prove infeasible, by changing
the planning model to conform to the predictability of planning data.
The outcome achieved ultimately rests on the persons responsible for
executing it. Although plans are often not followed with precision, the
failure often lies in the plan's imperfections and not in human perversity.
A plan obviously cannot be adhered to if it is infeasible. But a feasible
plan is only a necessary condition, and not a sufficient one. A plan may
be "perfect," but it fails in its purpose if it is not followed due to
faulty communications, poor motivation, or other management shortcomings.
footnote continued from p. 51
place from a complex world into a simplified model of that world. The
model is then manipulated in order to find a "solution" in abstract terms.
Finally, this solution is transformed back into the complex form. The
transformed version of the abstract solution may or may not provide a real
solution. Failure signifies that some essential characteristics of the
real world were lost in the transformation.
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A job shop schedule illustrates these concepts. Because of limited
ir.formation handling capacity, n planner might have to use an unrealistic
planning model--for example, the standard backdating scheme that implicitly
assumes infinite capacity. Under these circumstances, the schedule can
provide only a loose guide to action and a rough approximation of outcomes
(in terms of such variables as scheduled delivery times, machine and labor
utilization, and work-in-process inventory levels)
.
Alternatively, the schedule might be generated through a detailed
simulation of the shop (Emery, 1961) . The model itself may be a perfect
abstraction, but the predicted values of capacities and processing times
may--and, in general, will--be somewhat in error. As a result, the shop
may not be able to follow the schedule precisely. Hopefully, however, the
predictions will be good enough to serve as a useful guide between scheduling
intervals.
9. THE LIMITATIONS OF PLANNING
Like all factors of production, the optimum allocation of resources
for the planning function occurs at that point where its expected marginal
value equals its marginal cost. In order to assess the value of additional
planning information, one must first determine the effect of the information
on organizational behavior (Marschak, 1960 and 1963) . Once this has been
done, the evaluation of alternative planning systems involves the same sort
of selection process as required in any planning.
A planner obviously selects a planning system that he feels will, on
the average, induce desirable lower-level behavior. However, the plans
generated by ary system are virtually always ambiguous to some extent, and
they nay be unrealistic in the fense that they call for infeasible actions
or actions that are inferior to alternatives that can be perceived by those
constrained by the plan.
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to predict the precise
effects of a plan. It will obviously have some influence on lower-level
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behavior, but the decision process by which an ambiguous or unrealistic
plan is resolved often depends on a number of subtle factors not con-
sidered by the high-level planner. Despite these difficulties, the planner
presumably feels that the plan is justified on the grounds that the behavior
it induces has a higher expected utility than that achieved in the absence
of the plan.
Let me use again the case of a job shop schedule to illustrate this
point. Suppose that the schedule assigns to a machine more work than it
can perform during a given time period. This may happen, for example, if
actual processing times turn out to take longer than originally predicted,
or if the schedule did not explicitly consider machine capacities because
of the added effort that this would have entailed.
In this case, the original schedule cannot be executed as planned,
and the dispatcher responsible for executing it must make some adjustments.
In doing this, he must employ some sort of decision process to resolve
conflicts among jobs. His decision process might call for running the
jobs in the order scheduled, or it may involve more complex considerations.
Given the unpredicted circumstances, it might very well be better if
the dispatcher deviates from the processing order originally scheduled.
A critical job, for example, might be unduly delayed by a slavish adherence to
die job order shown in the original schedule. In this situation, it is
difficult to predict how the dispatcher will react. His actions depend,
among other things, on the organizational pressures exerted by the control
system to conform to schedules even though they become clearly unrealistic.
Thus, an essential factor in determining the effect on behavior of a
given planning process is the detail and realism of the plans that it generates.
In order to generate increasingly unambiguous and realistic plans, the planning
process must be increasingly complex and must handle an increasing volume of
data
.
Realism in planning also calls for the accurate prediction of basic
planning data subject to varying degrees of uncertainty. Uncertainty exists
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about such matters as competitors' strategies, future technological de-
velopments, and the value of variables subject to random fluctuations
(Hitch and McKean, 1960, pp. 188-192). The organization has several ways
of improving planning in the face of such uncertainty.
It can, for example, improve the accuracy of predicting planning data
by various institutional means. One way of doing this is to enter certain
contractual arrangements to create a "negotiated environment" (Cyert and
March, 1963, p. 118). Hedging, insurance, and long-term fixed-price con-
tracts with suppliers illustrate this approach. The organization can also
employ general-purpose equipment and manpower in order to impose more ag-
gregate--and hence more predictable--constraints on planning. The use of
various decoupling devices also increases predictability, since they allow
each subunit to absorb most of the minor random disturbances that impinge
on it
.
Greater accuracy in predicting planning data can often be gained by
collecting additional data and performing more complex transformations on
them--a sophisticated regression analysis, say. Sequential decision making,
short planning cycles, and a control system providing rapid feedback reduce
the planning horizon over which predictions must be made, and thereby in-
crease the accuracy of prediction.
Planning models can be used to provide information about the sensi-
tivity of outcomes to uncertainty. Instead of using single estimates for
planning data, a range of estimates might be employed. For example, some
planning systems use a "pessimistic," a "most likely," and an "optimistic"
estimate to characterize the uncertainty of a given prediction. The planner
can then assess the outcomes of alternative plans under varying degrees of
•k
See p. 34.
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pessimism or optimism.
The reduction of uncertainty is not achieved without a cost. Risks
transferred in an effort to achieve a negotiated environment must be assumed
by someone else, and this person must be compensated for his risk-taking.
Flexibility in resources adds to their cost. Increased sophistication in
predicting planning data increases the cost of data collection, storage,
retrieval, and computation. Explicit consideration of multiple values
of planning data increases factorially the number of alternatives that must
be evaluated (Hitch and McKean, 1960, p. 193).
A planner faces a limitation on the cost and time he can devote to
planning. There comes a point where it is cheaper for the organization
to "play it by ear" than it would be to spend additional effort in formu-
lating more realistic plans. And even if this were not the case, the
processing time required to generate more elaborate plans may simply exceed
the allowed response time. The planner must recognize these cost, time,
and uncertainty limitations. He must try to strike a balance between the
costs of improved planning versus the costs of muddling through with some-
what ambiguous and unrealistic plans.
10. COMPUTER PLANNING MODELS
The planning process discussed up to this point represents a con-
ceptual viewpoint largely independent of the methods used to implement
it. The topic I now want to consider is the role that computers might
play in this process --particularly at the higher- levels within the organi-
zation. My comments are necessarily somewhat speculative, and are there-
fore no doubt subject to the usual hazards of speculation: wild, un-
supported fancies and plus hopes on the one hand, and unimaginative common-
places on the other. I will try my best to avoid these risks.
Despite a few caveats, there seems to be a general concensus that com-
puters will contribute increasingly to planning at all levels. Nevertheless,
skeptics would certainly have no difficulty in marshalling ample empirical
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evidence to support a less sanguine view. The results achieved to date
in using computers for high-level "strategic" planning have been rela-
tively drab and meager compared with their widespread use for low-level
"operational control" (Deardon, 1964) .
I can see in our past experience no compelling evidence to support
a view that inherent limitations preclude the use of computers in strategic
planning. Developing formal computer models to aid the planner obviously
presents a task of great difficulty—but not a unique one. A planner
cannot avoid the use of a model, whether he relies on a formalized model
or his own intuition. There is every reason to suppose that formalized
computer models can assist the planner in doing this.
The use of computers in planning certainly does not imply that the
planner must abdicate his responsibilities to the machine. In order to
make a major improvement in the planning process, we will have to draw
upon the best characteristics of both man and machine.
The meager evidence that we have suggests that a symbiosis between
the man and the computer will prove especially powerful and fruitful in
coping with the enormously complex problems encountered in organizational
planning. To the humtan component in a man -machine system is relegated
the responsibility for proposing alternative plans and placing a utility
value on the predicted consequences. The machine is assigned the compu-
tational task of determining the consequences of each alternative by means
of a formal model.
The great advantage of such a system is that it does not require the
complete formalization of the total decision process. Those decisions and
utility functions that are well understood and capable of being described
foiaially can be incorporated into the computer model. Decisions and utilities
that cannot be so formalized are simply reserved for the human decision maker.
The formalized planning model is used by the computer to transform
decision variables into outcome variables. For example, in determining
the consequences of a proposed increase in the aggregate production rate,
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the computer must make some assumptions about the allocation of production
capacity. In doing this, the computer should distribute production in an
"optimal" fashion subject to the specified aggregate capacity constraint.
Based on these detailed "decisions," the computer can then determine such
outcome variables as manufacturing costs and expected stockouts . To the
extent possible, the computer should also provide the planner with infor-
mation helpful in making the aggregate production rate decision--the relation
of the projected to the "optimal" inventory level, for instance.
Does this encroach on the planner's authority for decision making?
Exactly the opposite is the case. The planner must participate in the
development of the algorithms by which his aggregate decisions are amplified
into detailed plans. If the algorithms incorporate the planner's goals,
he can then formulate high-level plans with a reasonable confidence that
the resulting detailed plans will be satisfactory.
In the absence of such a formalized model, the high-level planner
has little assurance that his plans will be translated faithfully. Although
he may participate in the specification of policies, the development of
procedures, and the selection and training of personnel to generate detailed
plans, nevertheless a great deal of "noise" is introduced during the hier-
archical translation of high-level plans into low-level plans. Lower levels
in the organization have a vast catalogue of devices for frustrating the
execution of grand strategy, most of which are evoked merely out of mis-
understanding and confusion. Computer planning will certainly not eliminate
these problems, but it can mitigate them by transferring part of the trans-
lation process to a formalized model.
Computer planning models, like the less formal ones, will have a hier-
archical structure (Dalkey, 1962; Manheim, 1964). Factoring will be necessary,
as before, in order to break up the global task into manageable subtasks
.
However, a given planner can have access to a hierarchy of models, rather
than just a single-level model. He can first formulate a high-level plan
by means of a sequential search through a low-resolution plan space described
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by an aggregate model. Upon finding a satisfactory plan, he can then im-
mediately explore the plan in greater depth by using more detailed, higher-
resolution models.
The partial fragmentation of global planning obviously introduces the
problem of coordination. Nevertheless, the problem is much less severe
with man-machine systems than it is with conventional planning.
For one thing, the global task need not be fragmented to the same
extent as before, since the computer can handle much greater complexity
than the unaided planner. In effect, each model can have a wide "span of
control," thereby reducing the number of submodels and the hierarchical depth
of global planning. "Suboptimization" will still occur, but the more compre-
hensive nature of the planning models will reduce the penalities typically
associated with this process.
In addition, the enormous input-output capacity of modern computers
permits a close link of a computer model with the data base of the organi-
zation. Every planner can therefore have much closer access to informa-
tion about the plans of other organizational units as reflected in a common
data base. This will greatly- facilitate the coordination of activities
throughout the organization, thus further reducing the penalties of sub-
optimization.
Computer models will not change the iterative nature of planning.
This scheme provides an efficient means of communicating between hier-
archical levels in formalized as well as conventional planning. However,
man-machine iterative planning offers the advantage of explicitly identi-
fying unrealistic high-level plans during the detailed amplification by
lower-level models. As a result, the high-level planner can immediately
*
The weakest link between the computer and the data base is no longer
the input-output hardware, but rather the language by which wanted data
are described and retrieved. Lombardi (1964) argues this point cogently,
and suggests possible approaches to the problem.
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make appropriate modifications to his plan. In conventional systems, such
modification may not be made until long afterwards, when an exception message
identifies deviations in an unrealistic plan.
A man-machine system offers the obvious advantage of speeding up all
phases of the planning process. Plans can thus be formulated on the basis
of more recent information about the current state of the environment.
Greater speed in planning also permits quicker response to changes in existing
*
plans if that should prove necessary. Of far greater Importance, the com-
puter's speed permits relatively quick response to the planner's proposed
plans. The planner can therefore evaluate a larger number of alternative
plans, and consequently he stands a better chance of finding a superior one.
Furthermore, with a short response time it is reasonable to expect better
decisions, since the planner can retain a closer grasp of a complex problem
over the reduced response interval.
Finally, the relatively low cost of processing information in a man-
machine system will Induce a change in the balance between the cost and
value of additional planning. The economic balance point will shift
sharply toward the use of greater detail in planning, the consideration
of more alternatives, a more explicit evaluation of uncertainty, and a
closer link of planning and control.
11. MODIFICATION OF THE MAN-MACHINE SYSTEM TO
ACHIEVE ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION
A man-machine search scheme has as its purpose the location of a
The need for quick response applies almost exclusively to low-level
plans extending over a short planning horizon. Seldom is it deslrable--
and often it is extremely undeslrable--to alter high-level plans on the
basis of the scanty evidence furnished by very recent and "timely" data.
To do so is likely to Introduce more "noise" than "signal" into the
planning process, since the data would normally represent too small a
sample of the environment to contain much information.
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satisfactory plan out of the set of all alternative plans that can be
generated and described by the algorithms and variables used In the
composite hierarchical planning model available to the planner. This
set by no means Includes all "real" alternatives, since not every possible
alternative can be generated by a given planning model. The plan space
defined by a model's decision and outcome variables represents only an
infinitesimal portion of the organization's "real" plan space. Further-
more, only a very small fraction of the points Included in even this
reduced space remains accessible to the planner. For example, the model
will not generate an Inventory distribution that is "non-optimal" in terms
of the model's algorithm for allocating aggregate production.
The planner naturally seeks improved plans out of the real alterna-
tives available to him, and not just the potential candidates found in
the space of the existing planning model. This does not mean, however,
that he should have complete access to every conceivable alternative.
On the contrary, the very purpose of the planning model is to confine
the planner's search to a "good" region of the real space, and to exclude
"bad"--and therefore irrelevant- -portions . The planner must aim at im-
proving the model so that it provides access not to a greater number of
*
alternatives, but rather to fewer and better alternatives.
This philosophy leads the planner to employ modifications in the
man-machine planning model as the predominant mechanism for generating
improved plans. The planning model should be highly parameterized to
facilitate these changes. For example, an inventory control algorithm
should Include a carrying cost parameter that can be modified readily.
If a temporary shortage of funds within the organization forces a reduction
The ideal model makes accessible only a single plan--the optimum
one in terms of the real alternatives and real goals of the organization,
Such a model would obviously have. to formalize all decision processes
and all utility functions for the organization.
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in inventory, the planner can accomplish this by Increasing the carrying
cost parameter. The "knob" to adjust the parameter can simply be turned
until a satisfactory level of inventory is found through a trial-and-error
process. The system can aid the planner in setting the parameter value
by providing him with information such as the implied trade-off between
inventory dollars and the expected number of stockouts.
A change in an algorithm represents a more basic type of modification
in the planning model than does a change in its parameters. For example,
an inventory distribution algorithm may be revised to include some refine-
ment--the explicit consideration of capacity constraints, say. The planning
model should be designed to permit great flexibility in making such changes.
This can be done, for instance, by the use of "modular" programming tech-
niques and "higher-level" languages (Emery, 1962)
.
Even more fundamental changes in the planning model can be made. For
example, the structure of the model may be altered by combining two or more
activities that previously were planned independently. This might occur,
say, when the scheduling of two factories is combined in order to find
joint optimum schedules instead of independently suboptimized schedules.
Making adjustments of the type described requires planning, and
therefore involves a search among alternative plans. Once again, the
planner confronts a vast space of undefined alternatives--in this case,
the space of alternative planning models rather than alternative operating
plans. In order to find a fundamentally improved model he must employ
efficient search techniques.
Ad hoc "knob-turning" adjustments to an existing planning model provide
a means of searching for improved models. However, even the most efficient
sequential search techniques reveal only a minute part of the abyss of alter-
native models. The planner must employ more powerful techniques in order
to find really fundamental improvements. A hierarchical search can again
prove useful for such a purpose. This requires the development of a higher-
level metamodel designed specifically for the purpose of exploring for
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,,iOved models
.
For example, industrial dynamics models could be used for such experi-
.(ation (Forrester, 1961; Roberts, 1963). Industrial dynamics models
lit''
^
particularly appropriate for an investigation of systems having many
,^,^acting variables, and this is precisely where one must focus attention
,) seeking fundamental systems improvements. The structure of the organi-
,*>'"
^
.
I
on and the links between its components are basic determinants of organi-
,
I onal behavior ,
In developing the metamodel, one must choose appropriate outcome
fables that provide a means of comparing the performance of alternative
machine planning models. Stability and dynamic response characteristics
^
dmong the most important measures for describing the behavior induced
,,
given planning system. An industrial dynamics metamodel can provide
^^«eful display of dynamic behavior by means of a trajectory through time
,iny desired variable.
Using such a metamodel, the planner can explore the space of alter-
. f
'te man-machine models until he judges that the cost of further search
fd exceed the expected gain. The terminal values of the metamodel
i4ibles--decision rules, delays, and the flows of resources and informa-
.^,,/--are then transformed into the corresponding values in the planning
1^1. If the metamodel provides a sufficiently accurate abstract repre-
^^Mtion of the planning model, then the planning model should have
,whly the same dynamic characteristics as the chosen metamodel.
12. CONCLUSIONS
I would not deny for a minute that a man-machine planning system re-
^y£8 an extremely ambitious program to implement. A prudent manager
; d do well to treat very gingerly any suggestion that such a system be
/*. loped for his organization. I am convinced, however, that man-machine
^ (tms roughly of the type described in this paper (for which I claim no
*/'
.f^^ originality, of course) will play a central role in the management
.^/rganizations
.
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An organization currently pays an inordinate price for planning.
It pays in the form of the costt required to sustain its present planning
"model" --the organizational hierarchy engaged in the amplification of high-
level plans into more detailed form. It also pays in the form of unnecessarily
poor performance.
The generation of substantially better plans is so complex a task that
only through an elaborate man-machine system can we hope to come to grips
with it. Such a system will provide an efficient means of performing a
sequential. Iterative search through a hierarchical plan space of the organi-
zation.
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